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FinancialInnovations in International Financial Markets
ABSTRACT
The central theme of this paper is that financial
innovation has become a major force effecting the United
States and other developed economies. The common features of
the process include product innovation, securitization,
liberalization of domestic financial market practices,
globalization of markets, and increased competition among
financial institutions. The paper offers a review of the
product and process changes that have occurred in
international financial markets, an analysis of the factors
leading to these changes, and an examination of the
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I. Introduction
Awave of financial innovation begun in the early 196 Os is now
sweeping throughout theUnitedStates and other developed economies,
producing major changes in thefinanciallandscape. While the details
of the process differ country by country, there are several common
features including (i) Innovation ——thedevelopment of new financial
products and markets, (ii) Securitization —-agreater tendency toward
market—determined interest rates and marketable financial instruments
rather than bank loans (iii) Liberalization —-ofdomestic financial
market practices either through explicit deregulation or a breaking
down of conventions, (iv) Globalization --asnational barriers erode
and financial markets grow more integrated and (v) Increased
competition among financial institutions with many of the traditional
distinctions between commercial banks, investment banks and securities
firms becoming blurred in the process.1
A major feature of this process has been the introduction of a
wide variety of new products that trade in new market settings,
thereby reducing the reliance upon banks for traditional credit
instruments and credit evaluations. Many of these new products (e.g.
currency and interest rate swaps, currency and interest rate options)
are of obvious assistance for risk management purposes ——toenable
theindividualor firm to tailor the various dimensions of risk (e.g.
currency, maturity, credit, interest rate, default, and so forth) more
precisely than before. Other products (e.g. Note Issuance Facilities
and Eurocurrency Commercial Paper) appear to directly reduce the cost
of funding a desired financial position. The basic principles
1underlying today's new financial products are being extended and re—
applied to yield still more products.2
It is not an exaggeration to claim that these developments are
having a profound impact on all aspects of the financial services
industry. For individual employees, innovation has affected the job
descriptionof the typical bank "lending" officer at major money—
center banks, the human capital needed to perform well and even the
definition of normal business hours.At the level of the financial
servicesfirm, innovation has affectedthe geographic location of
activities, the financial product line, the risks that are being
traded or carried, the identity of the major players and the intensity
of competition. Non—financial firms are faced with a vast array of
financial choices ——newfinancial markets and products, each with
their own risk and return properties ——thatrequire increasingly
sophisticated analysis. Naturally, all of these factors feed into
macroeconomic performance. Policymakers and regulatory agencies are
keen to understand the potential benefits (or costs) of these new
products, new procedures and new players and to incorporate these new
factors into macroeconomic policies and regulatory decisions.
The general theme of this paper is to provide a broad
assessment of these recent developments surrounding financial
innovation including their impact on financial stability and national
policymaking. This theme suggests several basic questions:
i) What financial product and process changes have occurred
over the last 20—25 years in U.S. and interhational
financial markets?
ii) What factors account for these changes?
iii) What are the implications of these changes for individuals
and the aggregate macro—economy from both a positive and
policy perspective?
2The purpose of this paper is to lay a foundation that will address
these questions.
We begin in Section II by outlining the dimensions of the
international financial marketplace. Data presented on the volume of
activity in the Eurocurrency and Eurobond markets offer a good
reflection of the general phenomenon in financial markets ——
mushroomingvolume, transforming markets once thought to be. ancillary
or for a specialized few into major centers of activity. Data on the
extentof securitization and on trading in new risk management and
funding vehicles (e.g. futures, options, and swaps) are also
presented. Again the pictureis one of securities or markets that were
virtuallynon—existent a decade ago, but now have grown to substantial
importance.
InSection III, we present an overview of the types of new
financial products that are available and their functions. Several
financial market innovations are described to illustrate their
workings and recent evolution and to demonstrate how the products add
value for market participants. These examples also illustrate how new
financial products might be engineered from existing products. This is
important to demonstrate that the new instruments need not add new
price risk to the system, but by adding liquidity and new
intermediaries, they may contribute additional credit or liquidity
risks.
The causes of financial market innovation are explored in Section
IV.We first consider the demand for financial market services in a
"Perfect Capital Market" setting, and then argue that financial market
innovations may be viewed as attempts to overcome real world market
3imperfections. A distinction is made between imperfections that are
ran—made (e.g. taxes, regulatory barriers, and information disclosure)
versus those that segment domestic markets and are naturally present
(e.g. transaction costs, heterogeneous expectations, and heterogeneous
consumption/investment/riskpreferences). Innovations that overcome
the former may directly thwart national economic policies, including
useful pndential policies, while innovations that overcome the
latter tend to increase economic (allocational) efficiency.
The implications of financial market innovation are discussed on
two levels. First, in Section V1 we examine the consequences of
innovation on financial market prices, international price
relationships and financing opportunities. Then in Section VI, we
analyze the consequences of innovation for macro-prudential policy and
broader macroeconomic policy.
On the markets side, innovations act to reduce the impact of
market imperfections, whether man—made or natural. As a result, we
should expect to observe greater capital mobility, greater similirity
inthe cost of funds in alternative capital markets, greater
integration of international capital markets and greater
substitutabilityamong assets as a result of improved hedging
opportunities.
On the policy side, there are two major concerns. One is whether
recent innovations have the capacity to impose negative externalities
on society. As stated above, innovations act to reduce the impact of
markets imperfections, including those macro—prudential policies
designed to improve welfare by safeguarding the financial system. One
specific concern is that the innovative process has led to a kind of
"regulatory arbitrage" with financial institutions attempting to lower
4their costs and expand their activitiesby seeking out the least
regulated environment. These shifts in activity have raisedfears that
innovation may increase the risk burden on financialinstitutions and
adversely affect the safety and soundness of the financialsystem.
These fears are compounded by theprospectof nations competing for
financial services activity by further reductions inthe regulatory
burden.
Securitization poses another specific example ofpotential welfare
losses associated with financial innovation. Securitizationand the
increased use of financial intermediariesplace the burden of credit
evaluation on a larger pool of participants; the increase inmarket
linkages may itself be seen as a source of added risk. Tosome extent,
this may be because the new instruments lacktransparency (i.e. they
are not well understood) and they have not stood the test oftwo or
three business cycles. Increased reliance on themarket system (i.e.
adequate information disclosure of off—balance sheet items,marking—
to-market of financial positions, and so forth)may provide an
adequate remedy for some of these fears.
The second major policy concern is the impact of financial
innovation on macroeconomic policies in general andmonetary policy in
particular. At one level, these concerns are operational. The
availability of variable rate financing and hedging techniques makes
thetiming and incidence of monetary policy more uncertain. And
related to this, the increasing ease of substitutability between
assetsand new techniques of obtaining credit may reduce the meaning
and usefulness of traditional monetary and credit aggregates as
indicators of monetary policy.
5A more fundamental concern is that greater internationalmobility
of capital and tighter integration of financial markets hasaltered
the channels through which monetary policy works,ultimately
threatening the welfare gains associated with international trade.
Innovation appears to have reduced (to various degrees indifferent
countries) the ability of authorities to adopt directquantitative
controls over credit or interest rate ceilings. With theeffectiveness
of the credit and controls channels reduced, itappears that monetary
policy now has a greater impact on exchange rates, directlyeffecting
the real competitiveness of domestic manufacturing. Acountry
following a comparatively tight domestic monetary policy is therefore
likely to lose international competitiveness, possiblysetting off
demands for trade protection. To the extent that countriesseek to
reduce the variability of exchange rate movements, thenew financial
environment limits the scope for effective andindependent domestic
monetary policies.
Viewed in isolation, the recent wave of financial innovations
holds the potential to produce an international allocationof capital
that is more consistent with economic risk/return considerationsand
allocational efficiency. An erosion of the gains from trade in
manufactures and commodities would represent significantpotential
welfare losses. The major policy question, then, is whether freetrade
is antithetical to capital liberalization.Dealing with this added
dimension of policy coordination will be thechallenge for policy
makers in the years to come.
6II. Dimensions of International Financial Markets
The international financial marketplace hasundergone a tremendous
expansion in terms of the variety of products, the volume oftrading,
and the capitalized value of available securities. Thedata presented
in this section suggest that a variety of financialmarkets, which
were in their infancy or non—existent two decadesago, have grown to
becomemajor centers of activity and influence. The growth of these
markets demonstrates their significance and potentialimplications for
investors,corporate managers, and national policymakers. We beginby
reviewing the growth of three traditional international financial
markets ——theforeign exchange market, the Eurocurrency market and
the Eurobond market. Then data on the rise of securitizationare
presented, followed by measures of activity in the markets for
futures,. options and swaps.
A.Foreign Exchange and the Euro—markets
The foreign exchange market, the inter—bank market for the
exchange of bank deposits denominatedin different currencies, has
existedin one form or another for centuriesand could hardly be
calleda modern innovation. In recent times, the foreign exchange
market has been organized as a dispersed, broker—dealer market with
high—speedtelecommunications systems linking together the various
participants in this worldwide, 24-hour market. The volume and
efficiency of the market is such that the spread between bid and offer
prices in the spot market is often one—tenth of one percent, or less,
forthe major currencies.
The data in Table 1 suggest the tremendous volume of activity
handled in the foreign exchange market and its recent growth. Surveys
carried out within the last year indicate that London is the most
7active foreign exchange trading location with transactionstotalling
$90 billion per day. New York is the second most active centertrading
$50 billion per day, and Tokyo is close behind with $48 billionper
day. The total for these three centers is $188 billionper day. Adding
in the contributions from other centers (e.g.Frankfurt, Zurich, Hong
Kong and Singapore), worldwide foreign exchange could possibly exceed
$250 billion per day, or more than $60 trillion per year.3 Withan
order flow of this size, many times in excess of world GNP andworld
trade, it becomes easy to understand the depth and speed• of the
foreign exchange market.
Insert Table 1 here
For comparison, daily trading volume in New York in 1977was
estimated to be only $5 billion, one—tenth of the estimated volume in
1986. The growth of trading in New York over this period wasprobably
greater than that in London, and therefore overstates the worldwide
growth in foreign exchange trading. Nevertheless, foreign exchange
trading clearly grew at a faster pace than other nominal magnitudes
over this ten—year period. The figures for New York also indicate
changes in the composition of trading, away from. the Canadian dollar
and certain European currencies and toward the Japaneseyen and
Deutsche mark.
The Eurocurrency market has a much shorter tenure than the foreign
exchange market. The Eurocurrency market, a market for deposits
denominated in a currency different from the indigenous currency of
the financial center, began to take shape in the early 1960s. The
Russians played an important role in the early development of the
8market. They were reluctant in thoseCold War days to hold theiru.s.
dollars (needed for internationaltrade transactions) in U.S.
accounts. Instead, they deposited theirdollars in Paris withan
affiliate of a state—owned, Russian bank.4Thetrue stimulus to the
Eurocurrency market, however, was the differentialregulation between
offshore and onshore banking operations.Particular u.s. banking
regulations (i.e. interest rate ceilingson time deposits, mandatory
reserve requirements held at zero interest,and mandatory deposit
insurance) became increasingly costlythroughout the l960s, resulting
in a greater share of bankingactivity being pushed offshore. The
innovation in the Eurocurrency market isan example of "unbundling" --
inthis case, taking the exchange riskof one currency (the U.S.
dollar, for example) and combining it with theregulatory climate and
political risk of another financial center.
Insert Table 2 here
The data in Table 2 indicate thegrowth of the Eurocurrency
deposit market, from roughly zero in 1960 toover $3.0 trillion on a
gross basis and over $1.5 trillion on a net basis(netting out all
interbank deposits) in 1986. Themarket, once exclusively dollar—
denominated, has now stabilized to becomeroughly 75—80% dollar based,
with the currencies of other industrializedcountries making up the
remainder of the market. TheEurocurrency market was once small enough
to be ignored; today it rivals U.S. financialmarkets in terms of
sizeand importance. The short—term lending rate in theEurocurrency
market (LIBOR, or London Interbank OfferRate) as it has been
determined largely by free—market forces, has become thereference
rate for many onshoreloan agreements, floating rate notes and other
9contracts as well as Euromarket loans.
Over the years, because of its rapid growth andapparent lack of
regulation, the Euromarket has been feared by some as asource of
macroeconomic instability or as a wobbly pyramidprone to crisis.
Nearly all Eurocurrency banks are major players in theirparent's
domestic market and could be subject to regulation via thisangle. In
1974, central bankers from the Group of Ten issued ageneral statement
of responsibility (the Basle Concordant) indicating thatcountries
would extend lender—of—last—resort facilities for thesolvency of
their Eurobanks.5 The motivation heremay have been to encourage
national banking authorities topay closer attention to their members
Eurobanking operations and to reduce the public's fear ofan
international banking panic. In 1980, the BISannounced another
agreement requiring banks to produce consolidated statements of their
worldwide activities, including offshore assets andliabilities. This
consolidation would enable bank examiners to monitor thequality of
offshore lending on the same basis as domestic offices.
Eurocurrency markets and Eurobanking operations have become a
commonplace feature in international finance. In 1981, the United
States acknowledged the importance of these new offshoremarkets and
authorized the establishment of InternationalBanking Facilities
within existing u.s. banking institutions. IBF5are not subject to the
regulations that apply to domestic banking activity (reserve
requirements and deposit insurance, in particular) and are free to
engage in many offshore banking arrangements with non—residents.6
The Eurobond market developed at approximately thesame time as
the market for Eurocurrency deposits. Again, differentialregulation
10between offshore and onshore securitiesactivities played a key role
in stimulating the development of themarket. In 1963, the United
States adopted the so—called InterestEqualization Tax, effectivelyan
excise tax on American purchases ofnew or outstanding foreign stocks
and bonds. To no one's surprise, the lETeffectively closed foreigners
access to the U.S. bond market; to the surprise ofsome, the market
simply migrated offshore to London andLuxembourg. Other costly u.s.
regulations(further international capital controls anda 30%
withholding tax on interest payments to foreigners)nurtured the
environment for the Eurobond market.
The remarkable growth record of the Eurobondmarket is presented
in Table 3. From the first Eurobondfloated in 1957, the volume ofnew
offerings reached $6.3 billion in 1972. Twoyears later, the United
States abolished the lET and its capitalcontrol program. Eurobond
underwritings plunged to $2.1 billion in 1974 and thefinancial press
was anticipating the death of the market. ButEurobonds and U.S. bonds
continued to differ in several importantways ——investorsin
Eurobonds paid no withholding tax and held bearersecurities, and
issuers of Eurobonds avoided costly and timeconsuming SEC disclosure
requirements. These differences proved to be substantialand the
Eurobond market expanded sixty-fold in the next elevenyears.
Insert Table 3 here
New offerings in the U.S. dollar segment of themarket now exceed
the volume of new corporate bond issues in theUnited States.
Treasurers of major corporations are nowgeared to conduct bond issues
either of fshore or onshore depending on marketconditions. Even the
U.S.Treasury has joined the parade to the Eurobond market with
11several so—called "Targeted Treasury Issues," inan attempt to lower
the Treasury's funding costs.
B. Measures of Securitization
Theincrease in securitization, the tendency foran economy to
have a greater proportion of its assets in the formof marketable
securities and bearing market—determined prices,can be seen from a
variety of indicators. The par value of outstandingpublicly traded
bonds, as shown in Table 4, totaled roughly $7.8 trillion atthe end
of 1986, reflecting a 25% increase over 1985. SalomonBrothers (1986)
estimates that about half of this increase is theresult of the
dollar's depreciation. But the nearly five—fold increasein the market
value of bonds relative to 1975 makes the long—termtrend toward
securitization apparent. The ratio of the market valueof bonds to GDP
has risen from 50% in 1980 to 71% in 1985,showing another measure of
increasing securitization.
Insert Table 4 here
Another measure of securitization and its implications is
presented in Table 5. Net borrowings by U.S. non—financial
corporations have traditionally relied heavily on bank loans,
traditionally a non-traded asset. In 1981 and 1982, bank loans and
securitized financing were roughly equal in magnitude;by 1986, more
than three—quarters of net new financings were in a securitizedform.
One explanation for this phenomenon is that for a variety ofreasons
(but primarily a deterioration in the quality of bank loan portfolios)
the credit ratings of banks have fallen relative to their best
12customers. Corporations have observed thatfunding costs could be
reduced by going directly to the market. As themost credit—worthy
customers are removed from a bank'sportfolio, this trend is
reinforced.The trend toward securitization is also reinforcedto the
extent that investors value liquidity andare willing to purchase
marketable securities at lower yields than a bankmight charge on
loans.
Insert Table 5 here
The trend toward securitizatjon in preferenceto traditional bank
lending is also visible in the international markets. Asshown in
Figure 1, syndicated bank loans captured nearly 60% of thismarket in
1982. In the years since, there has been asteady reduction in
syndicated bank lending, along with a steady increase ininternational
bond issues and Note Issuance Facilities. Thepreference for borrowing
through marketable securities seems to be firmly established.
Insert Figure 1 here
The market value of equity capital and its annual turnoverprovide
further evidence on the securitization of international financial
markets. The market value of equity shares reached $5.3 trillion at
the end of 1986, up by 25% from 1985 and nearly five—fold from1975,
as reported in Table 6. The U.S. share of the worldmarket has fallen
substantiallysince 1975, with Japan's share rising by a nearly
offsettingamount. The extent of securitization, as measured by the
ratioof market value of shares to GDP shows considerable dispersion,
from 13% in France to 77% in Switzerland. The recent trend toward
privitization, the sale of state—owned assets to private investors,
13is helping to increase these measures of securitization. Plansto
denationalize industries are in progress around the world. Morethan
$19 billion was raised through equity sales of state—ownedenterprises
in 1986, roughly 25% of total new equity issues world—wide.,7
Insert Table 6 here
The final innovative trend that enhances securitization isthe
transformation of formerly illiquid pools of assets into tradeable
securities, using pass—through certificates or collateralized
obligations as a structure. GNMA (Government National Mortgage
Association) pass—through certificates representing claims on apool
of GNMA—insured mortgages are perhaps the most well—knownexample, but
other federal and private financial institutions began to issue
similar certificates in the l970s. New issues of asset—backed
securities reached $269.0 billion in 1986, as reported in Table7.
Residential mortgages remain the dominate component of this market.
Securities representing commercial mortgages are now available,as
well as securities backed by automobile and credit card receivables at
the shorter end of the maturity spectrum.
Insert Table 7 here
C. New Risk Management and Funding Vehicles
The extent of financial innovation is perhaps best reflected in a
set of new risk management and funding vehicles ——futures,options,
and swaps ——thatcame into existence in the early 1970s and have
experiencedextraordinary growth, and importance beyond what the
numerical entries nay suggest. The aggregate openinterest in
14financial futures and options, a measure of thespeculative Capital at
risk in the market, rose to $680 billion atthe end of September 1986,
an increase of nearly 75% over the year—end 1985 figure.Open
interest, as reported in Table 8, is split roughly two—to—onebetween
futures contracts and option contracts. Futures andoptions written
against contracts on interest bearing securities accountfor by far




Daily trading volume for futures and optionscontracts, reported
in Table 10, mirrors the above findings. The dominateshare of trading
volume is in interest rate contracts, more so in thecase of futures
than in options. Andamongcontracts on interest bearing securities,
the3—month Eurodollar futures contract is by far the mostpopular,
accowiting for about 75% of all activity. The 3-monthEurodollar
futurescontract currently trades roughly 50,000 —75,000contracts
perday, representing an aggregate face value of $50—75 billion. The
Eurodollar contract is useful for hedging LIBOR interest rate
exposure, which as we noted earlier, has become the major reference
rate for pricing variable rate bank lending and floating rate note
(nil) securities.
Insert Table 9 here
Another indicator of the potential impact of financial futures
markets on trading behavior is illustrated in Figure 2, which graphs
the daily volume of treasury bond futures trading and the volume of
15trading in the underlying cash market. The data clearly show thatthe
volume of trading in futures contracts nowswamps the volume in the
cash market by a factor of four. A similar ratio maintainsbetween
trading volume in stock index futures and underlying equity shares.
Insert Figure 2 here
Thisdevelopment has raised fears that the heightened activity in
financial futures markets may be contributing tovolatility in
underlying cash markets. In particular "program trading," transactions
executed to remove arbitrage profits between futures and cashprices,
and "witching—hour effects," related to theconvergence of futures and
cash prices on the expiration day of the contracts, have been citedas
examples of the disruptive power of the new financial futures and
options markets. Careful studies need to be carried out to examine
these claims. Financial futures and options markets offer investorsa
combination of leverage and liquidity at exceedingly low transaction
costs. When news occurs and expectations change, investorsmay feel
that it is preferable to trade first in the futures market,leaving
the cash market to adjust somewhat later in response.8 Other evidence
suggests that the addition of the futures markets has raised the pool
of speculative capital in the market and that bid—offerspreads are
lower in the cash market when the futures market is open.9
Interest rate and currency swaps, the final products in this
overview, may be thought of as either risk management or funding
vehicles. As part of a financing plan, a swap enables the borrower to
unbundle the terms (currency, fixed—rate, variable—rate, and
so forth) under which he initially raises funds from the financing
terms he is ultimately seeking. For example, it is not obvious that a
16corporation seeking variable—rate dollar financingought to borrow in
the variable—rate dollar market)-0 If thecorporation has a
comparative advantage or a window of opportunity in thefixed—rate DX
bond market, itmightobtain a lower cost of funds byborrowing in
thissegment and swapping the proceeds into fixed—ratedollar funds.
The new financing alternative might bepresented to the corporation as
a package, allowing a comparison between it anda straightforward
issue of variable—rate dollar bonds.-Thealternatives could be
identical in all respects, except that thepackage containing the swap
carries the risk of default on theswap.
Swaps can also be used as risk management tools to alterthe
currency of denomination and interest rate structure ofassets and
liabilities. If the above corporation decidesthat variable—rate
dollar financing is no longer in its bestinterest, and it prefers
fixed—rate DX financing or fixed rate Canadiandollar financing, the
corporation can sell its swap or purchase otherswaps to alter its
position. This would very likely be cheaper thanredeeming its
previous bond issue and incurring additional floatation costs?1
Insert Table 10 here
The limited information available onswap activity is reported in
Table 10. Information is incomplete becauseswaps are carried as off-
balancesheet entries and no formal reporting is now required.
Thevolume of interest rate swaps outstanding is estimated to be $300
billion. Currency swaps associated withprimary bond issues (so—called
swap—driven bond issues) were estimated at $38 billion in1986, or
about 20% of new Eurobond issues. Other asset orliability based
currency swaps were estimated to be as large as $76 in 1986.
17III.Characteristjcs of Recent Financial Innovations
A. Functions of International Financial Markets and Alternative
Taxonom i es
Innovation takes place when it becomes profitable to better
fulfill any of the major functions of the international financial
sector. These functions include Ci)providingappropriate instruments
for making payments, (ii) facilitating monetary exchange between
currencies, (iii) facilitating the flow of savings towards investments
across national boundaries, and (iv) providing mechanisms for
allocating, diversifying and compensating for risk. A partial list of
new financial products, classified by their intermediation function is
presented in Table 11. It may be useful to explore these innovation
further using several alternative taxonoinies.
Insert Table 11 here
Dufey and Giddy (1981) have argued that most financial innovations
are aimed at either circumventing government regulations or are taken
in response to perceived relative price or relative risk changes.
Government policies ——inparticular, regulations that are not applied
uniformly across all parties or countries, and tax rates that are not
uniform across different sources and uses of income ——providea
fertile ground for the innovative process. Financial theory suggests
that securities can be used to transform income from higher taxed into
lower taxed forms, but the transformation is costly)2 Individuals
monitor the implied burden of differential taxation and regulation,
and shift their activities when the cost-benefit ratio is favorable.
Dufey and Giddy argue that in the l960s, the regulatory burden of the
U.S. financial system became too costly, providing the incentive for
18the development of the Eurocurrency andEurobond markets. In the
1970s, macroeconomic volatility increased the costof carrying
exposure, leading to a dramatic increase in the demandfor risk
managementvehicles.
Anotherwell—known taxonomy is the distinctionbetween "product"
and "process" innovations. The modern traditionof financial product
innovationmight begin with the Negotiable Time Certificatesof
Deposit introduced in the l960s and includeexchange traded foreign
currency futures contracts and equity option contracts introducedin
1972 and 1973 respectively. The innovativeprocess has exploded since
then. Exchange traded financial futures andoptions contracts, which
were virtually non—existent in 1970, nowcover dozens of securities
and synthetic instruments (e.g. the S & Pindex) and are traded in at
leastnine countries on four continents. Activeover—the—counter or
inter—bank markets exist for other products.Some products are generic
andfairly standardized (e.g.a spot DMcontract or a fixed rate
currencyswap). Other products have taken on proprietarynames (e.g.
CARS, Certificates on Automobile Receivables, from SalomonBrothers)
to afford some differentiated characteristicsto products that can be
imitated fairly easily. This kind of productdifferentiation may
enablethe innovating firm to appropriate a larger share ofthe
returns from innovation, but it alsomay require the firm to invest
heavily in a secondary market for its differentiated securities.
Modern examples of process innovations include the SWIFT(Society
for Worldwide Interbanic Financial Transfers) network forforeign
exchange payments, the grey market (or pre-market) in Eurobond
trading, the Euro—clear and Cedel systems for clearing Eurobonds, the
MESA network for clearing ECU transactions, and the establishment of
19formal linkages and dual listings between U.S. and foreign stockand
commodity exchanges. The European Monetary System (EMS) might be
viewed as a process innovation intended to stabilizeEuropean exchange
rates and, in turn, facilitate the use of the ECU.
The Black-Scholes option pricing model and other related models
might also be thoughtofas process innovations. This line of
theoretical research (i) provided a scientific underpinning foroption
pricing, (ii) indicated how option writers might manage their risksby
'delta hedging,' (iii) helped to popularize a technique forpricing
synthetic contracts (i.e. the replicating portfolio approach), and
(iv)alerted analysts to thefactthat Eany common financial contracts
could beusefully viewed as embodying option—like features (that might
be priced "scientifically") ——allof which encouraged the development
of new products and market—making activity. To take oneexample, Dufey
andGiddy (1981) noted that despite articles describing the benefits
of foreign exchange options, the market appeared to be failing because
the contracts were too specialized and too difficult to hedge. Since
bankswill generally be selling call options to corporate customers,
thereis no obvious place for banks to buy options to mechanically
squaretheir books. The 'delta hedging' procedure offered a reasonable
alternativefor risk management, which has enabled the inter—bank
foreign exchange option market to develop)3
Thetheory of finance suggests another approach for understanding
the recent wave offinancialinnovations. Investors and borrowers are
typically characterized as risk-averse welfare maximizers. In this
setting, we expect that individuals will desire the flexibility to
hedge against any contingent risk. If the available set of financial
20assets do not "span" all possiblecontingencies, then individuals
might be better of f having access to additionalsecurities whose
payoffs depend on these contingencies. The introductionof interest
rate futures, heating oil and crude oilfutures, and mOrtgage—bac
securities might be seen as products thathelp complete the menu of
financial products thus allowing individualsto reach their desired
exposure to particular risks. Some of these innovationsrepresent an
"unbundling" of existing financial products.14 Othernew products,
such as pass—through certificates, aresimply tradeable claims
collateralized by previously existing financialpositions, a process
of financial dis intermediation that closesthe gap between ultimate
borrowers and lenders.
Conditional on their exposure to risk, individualsalso seek to
maximize their expected investmentreturns, taking into account taxes
and the transaction costs of managing theirpositions. Many new
financialproducts (e.g. money market mutual funds, stock index
options and convertible bonds) represent acomposition or "bundling"
of more elementary financial instruments. Smallinvestors have
historically been attracted to mutual funds as away to attain
diversificationand scale economies, which lower the cost of financial
services, including professional management expertise. Butnow large,
institutional investors have become attracted tocomposite products
because they dramatically lower the cost ofestablishing and
maintaining a leveraged position, or acting upon fast—breaking news.15
A single innovation could draw on many of the characteristicsjust
enumerated. The evolution of zero—coupon securities providesa good
case in point.16Zero—coupon securities had existed for some time
(e.g. Treasury bills and U.S. Savings Bonds). In the 1970s, aggressive
21reading of the Federal tax code (regulatory channel) encouraged
dealers and investors to separate (unbundle) the principal and coupon
components of Treasury securities as distinct products. By selling the
corpus at a deep discount, the dealer might recognize a capital loss;
by purchasing this instrument, an investor might delay paying taxes
until the security had matured or was sold. Taxable corporations also
had an incentive to issue long—term zero—coupon bonds because of the
Treasury's method of computing implicit interest expense. Even after
the Treasury plugged these loopholes, demand for zero—coupon
instruments persisted from foreign investors, who faced more favorable
capital gains tax treatment on zeros, and from domestic investors, who
used zeros to match future liabilities, eliminate reinvestment risk
(hedging motives) and avoid bothering with coupons (convenience
motive). The securities industry responded to this demand by stripping
the coupons from existing securities, creating synthetic zeros
(unbundling), some with exotic (and proprietary) names. In January
1985the U.S. Treasury responded with its own innovation by announcing
that all future issues with a maturity of greater than ten years would
betransferable in their component pieces. The new product, STRIPS
(Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal Securities),
has been readily accepted with more than $90 billion of securities
outstanding.
22B. Engineering Innovative Financial Instruments
1. Swaps and Comparative Advantage
To set the stage for our later analysis, it will beuseful to
point put the reciprocal nature of demand forswaps and other hedging
instruments.This is clear from the typical diagrams usedto
illustrate the flows of funds in aswap transaction.For example,
(i) tiardfor 5-year sterlirg <>Sulyof 5-year dollars,
(ii)Dnrd for fixel rate furx2s c=> Sugply of floatirg rateftuds,
(iii)Daisni for IIfl basis tunis c Suply of NY Prime basis tunis.
The above situations are analogous tocommodity trade in the sense
that one country's demand for wheat is equivalent to itssupply
of cloth under the presumption that tradebalances. A stylized result
fromclassical trade theory is that countries are endowed with
differential supplies of (immobile) capital and labor whichgives rise
to production cost differentials. To takeadvantage of the situation,
countries tend to specialize in the production of theircomparative
advantage goods which they then trade, capturing the gains from trade.
The principles underlying a financialswap bear a strong
relationship to those of commodity trade and comparative advantage
theory.17 The feasibility of aswap (such as in cases i, ii and iii
above) between parties A and B hinges on the possibility that they
face different relative costs on the two pieces of theswap. The
followingexample uses an interest rate swap but the same principle
would apply to a currency swap. Suppose thatcompany Adesires to
borrow fixed—rate funds while company !desiresfloating-rate funds.
Supposefurther that the companies can borrow on the following tents:
23COMPANY A COMPANYB DIFFERENTIAL
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Company B borrows at a lower rate in either case (it has an
absolute advantage in both markets), but its relative orcomparative
advantage lies in the fixed—rate market. (A's comparative advantage is
in the floating—rate market.) It can be easily shown that ifA borrows
at floating—rate terms and B borrows at fixed—rate terms and the
companies then swap, there will be a 1 1/4% interest rate savings to
divide between the two firms and any financial intermediaries who
assist them.
What is the source of B's comparative advantage? A number of
reasons might explain it:
1.Certain lerders (e.g.insuraxrpanies) are
tstraThat to lerd to companies like B. Therefore, there isan ess sup1yoffurds thasirg finelike B.
2. Fixed-rate lerders are segmented haufloatirg-nte lerders, aid they have formel different expectations
regardinj A ax
3.The assets aidreceivables of!are predominantlyin
fixed-rate terms. arisequently, lerders perceive lower
risk associated with fixed-ratelerdingto
24It could be argued that if explanations #1or #2 are behind B's
comparative advantage, then for "small transactions,"amayexploit
its comparative advantage withoutlosing it, much the same as
commodity trade. In the aggregate, however, large—scale
transacting
would remove thesegmentationbarrier which is at the heart of this
swap transaction. On the other hand, if explanation 413 isvalid, the
market may be signalling its preference to providefixed—rate terms.
If company B borrows at fixed—rate terms andswaps, the market may
perceive that B is in a riskier position and turn itsrelative
(fixed/floating) borrowing terms against it. In thiscase, !has
traded away or reduced its comparativeborrowing advantage.
Explanation 413 clearly shows the need for disclosure of informationon
swap transactions so that the market can offer relative financing
terms that are consistent with a fin's financial risks.
Several related issues can be raised by examininga currency swap.
In the l960s and lS7Os, back—to—back loans andparallel loans (with
cash flows essentially the same as acurrency swap) were conducted to
avoid the United Kingdom's investment sterling marketor Latin
American capital controls. Many observers point to theWorldBank/IBM
swap in August 1981 as the beginning of the modern currency swap
market. The funding and risk management strategy of the World Bank at
that time called for borrowing in DM, Swiss franc and other low
interest rate currencies. In these smaller markets,repeated bond
issues can cause lending tens to deteriorate as domesticbuyers reach
asaturation point (sometimes the result of prudential regulation) in
their portfolios.
Inthe August 1981 deal, IBM borrowed DM and Swiss francs at
preferential rates (because of IBM's credit rating and scarcity
25value), the World Bank borrowed dollars (without concernover market
saturation), and thetwoparties then swapped the proceeds and the
future obligations to make payments.18 Eachcompany exploited its
comparative borrowing advantage and shared the gains from tradeto
produce a lower all—in cost of funds. The World Bank has continuedto
use currency swaps aggressively as an integral part of itsfunding
strategy.
2. Building Synthetic SecurIties
Two further examples will illustrate other aspects of the
innovation process. Suppose that a market forshort—term, unsecured
borrowing similar to the U.S. Commercial Paper market, but denominated
in DM, does not exist. Absent this market,companies can instead issue
U.S. dollar commercial paper, sell the proceeds forDM, and cover by
selling DM forward in exchange for dollars. The T—account inFigure 3a
demonstrateshow these two transactions approximate a DM commercial
paper instrument. The cost of funding in DM terms would be
approximatelytheactual U.S. dollar commercial paper rate (for a
particular maturity and credit risk) plus the forward premiumon
foreignexchange19
Insert Figure 3 and Figure 4 here
The gain from "constructing" DM commercialpaper in this fashion
might be measured by comparing the synthetic rate with the best
alternative DM rate, perhaps a short—term Euro—DM loan. Synthetic ON
commercial paper appears to offer a perfect substitute for "actual" DM
commercial paper. Figure4shows that the savings from issuing
constructed DM commercial paper were in the 30—90 basis pointrange
26during the early 19805. An actual market forDX Commercial paper will
develop only if savings on transaction costs(including liquidity
factors) warrant. If, in fact, a DM commercialpaper market develops,
actual prices must be set close to syntheticvalues so as to preclude
arbitrage. Similarities between actual andsynthetic commercial paper
prices will not indicate that the gains fromfinancial trade have
vanished --onlythat the gains are now embodieddirectly in the
interest rates themselves. Usingsynthetic commercial paper helps to
secure these gains from financial tradepermanently.
A related example is the Eurobond market forDX, Swiss francs and
other currencies which at times in the recentpast has been subject to
queuing restrictions by national officials.Queuing imposes costs on a
finbyrestricting their ability to access the bond market attimes
whenterms may be particularly favorable. TheT—accounts in Figure 3b
demonstrate how the proceeds from a Eurodollar bondcan be swapped for
DX (or other currencies) to create along-ten DM obligation that
approximates a Euro—DI.! bond. The cost of the constructedEuro—DM bond
would be approximately the U.S. dollar Eurobondrate (for a particular
maturityand risk class) plus the applicable forwardpremium on
foreignexchange2°
Thegain from constructing a Euro-Dpi bond in this fashion couldbe
measured by comparing the constructed rate with the ratethat might be
obtained once the fin was allowed access to the actualEuro-DM bond
market at some time in the future. If the synthetic Euro-DM bond
approach offers a liquid market, then queuing restrictions lose their
force and countries would be inclined to drop these restrictions.
Arbitrage would then insure that the current actual Euro—Dpi bond rate
approximates the synthetic Euro—DM bond rate. By forcing these two
27rates toward equality, borrowers would enjoy permanent relieffrom
queuing costs and other market access barriers.
3.Contract Innovation
A final area of financial innovation worth noting is in thedesign
of futures contracts. Black (1986) has modeled thesuccess and failure
of futures contracts based on their commodity characteristics,their
contract characteristics, and the interaction of these two variables.
Commodity characteristics include the durability, storability, and
homogeneity of the commodity as well as characteristics of the spot
market. Contract characteristics refer to contract size,delivery
dates, delivery locations, acceptable commodity grades for delivery,
and so forth. Delivery conditions play a large role in contract
specifications because even though most short contract positions are
liquidated by offset, some physical delivery of the underlying
commodity does take place.
The most important change in contract specification to effect
futures trading has been to allow for cash settlement of futures
contracts upon their expiration, rather than to require costly
delivery of physicals. This innovation might have been adopted years
ago except that a contract which could be settled only in cash was
considered a wager, and specifically outlawed in those states with
major futures markets. In 1974, futures trading came under federal
control (via the Commodity Futures Trading Commission), where no such
rules regarding gambling were in effect. By 1981, all theregulatory
channels had been cleared, and financial futures contracts specifying
cash settlement began trading. The vast appeal of these new contracts
is evident from the data on trading volume and open interest reviewed
earlier.
28C. Design and Evolution of Innovative Financial Instruments
cooper (1986) has recently argued that in most new financial
instruments, the underlying financial claims embodied in the contract
are largely the same as in the past; what has changed is the packaging
of the instruments as well as the speed, scope and other aspects of
the trading arrangements. As we have illustrated in theabove
examples, new financial contracts are often a transformation of
existing financial instruments. This technique, the "replicating
portfolio" approach, is central to the design of new financial
instrumentsand to their pricing. Examination of many new instruments
reveals thatthey reflect a bundling or unbundling of existing
securities that allows them to replicate something which already
exists at lower transaction costs.
Our examples demonstrate that new instruments may also replicate
securities which do not exist,but which the market may welcome (e.g.
DM commercial paper or DM bonds without queuing restrictions). In
principle, a security could be indexed toany contingent outcome in
order to replicate any desired financial contract, although in
practice it might have to issued offshore to avoid prohibitive
regulations •2l
Once the general principle behind a financial innovation is well-
known (either its transaction costs savings or its risk reducing
properties), the possibility exists to move the product from a custom-
design, small volume market to a standardized product with high volume
and lower transaction costs. This has been the evolution in several
cases, as illustrated in Table 12 for the currency and interest rate
swapmarket.
29Insert Table 12 here
It is important to point out that product innovation isnot a one-
way street. There are numerous examples of failure among exchange
traded futures contracts which illustrates that theseproducts, like
consumer goods, must meet the market test.22 Product innovation is
costly and because financial firms value their reputations and intend
to be infinite—lived, we expect that new products will offervalue-
added, at least in the short run. But because financial innovations
are likely to incorporate increasing complexity, it is essential for
non—financial firms to gain the necessary expertise in order to
evaluate the new products. Andforthese non—financial firms (as for
regulatory authorities) it is essential that the evaluation be
conducted on the basis of economic, risk—return criteria rather than
accounting conventions.
30IV. Causes of Financial Market Innovation
A. Financial Services Under Perfect Capital Markets
To better understand the role of swaps and other new financial
instruments in the real world, it will be useful to outline the nature
offinancial services that would exist in a "perfect" capital market.
We will then argue that departures from "perfect" capital markets
providethe necessary conditions for thedevelopment of new financial
productssuch as swaps, options and so forth.
For our purposes, the essential elements of a perfect capital
market are:
(i) no transaction costs
(ii) no taxes
(iii) no regulatory barriers or restraints
(but enforceable contracts)
(iv) a large number of small participants.
Uncertaintyregarding future economic outcomes is present, but
investors view the futuresimilarly.23 The absence of transaction
costsinsures that all investors share the same information base and
that they will agree on a fair valuation of securities. No
transactioncosts also implies that borrowers and lenders can act
directly in the market without depending on agents or intermediaries.
Finally, no transaction costs implies that securities are completely
divisible and may be issued in arbitrarily small units.
To complete the story, we assume that investors are risk—averse and
attempting to maximize their expected utility from lifetime
consumption.Two questions are of interest: What financial instruments
will be offered in the market and how will individualsand firms
utilize these instruments?
In this stylized setting, investors will desire the flexibility to
hedge against any contingent risk. It can be shown that if there are !2
31independent sources of risk, then n financial instrumentsrelated to
these sources of risk are sufficient foragents to form any portfolio
of their choosing.24 There could be more thann financial instruments
in the market, but these would represent combinationsof the original
n and would therefore be redundant. The financial marketcould be
labelled "complete" in the sense that investors couldhedge against
any contingent risk and form a portfolio with any risk—returnpattern.
In a perfect and complete market,any borrower or issuer could
enter the market and directly sell financial instruments(i.e. a loan,
option or some other well—defined contract) for fairvalue. A lender
or investor, on the other hand, could expect to find financial
instruments capable of hedgingany risk and enabling him to achieve
any desired risk—return pattern. In a perfect and completemarket, the
menu of financial instruments allows everyone completeflexibility to
meet their desired financial objectives.
B. Financial Services with Imperfect Capital Markets
The assumptions of perfect capital marketsare substantially at
odds with the real world. A variety of barriers existwhich
potentially might lead to departures from the various arbitrage and
parity conditions applicable for international capital markets under
perfect capital market assumptions. The most basic such parity
condition is a variant of the "Law of One Price"applied to the
financial market ——similarsecurities (or combinations of securities)
representing similar exposures to risk ought to sell for the same
price regardless of the point of sale. This law predicts, forexample,
that an IBM seven-year straight U.S. dollar bond floated in London
ought to command the same price as a similar security floated in New
32York or Tokyo. A financial market law ofone price is, in essence, a
statement about the integration of internationalcapital markets and
thatcapital flows (i.e. arbitrage) will take place toequalize
currency—adjusted and risk—adjusted rates of returneverywhere.
Real world market imperfections can be divided intotwo groups:
policy—related(or man-made) and behavioral (natural) barriers.
Policy—related imperfections include taxes, rulesregarding
information disclosure or accounting conventions, andother regulatory
barriers. The latter includes factors such asreserve requirements in
banking,interest rate ceilings, market access flies(e.g. queuing),
ownership restrictions on shares, legality of amonetary unit and
other financial instruments (e.g. ECU—denominated debtsand bearer
securities) and rules regarding market entry and permissible
activities (e.g. the Glass—Steagall Act). These nationalregulations
are promulgated with diverse objectives in mind ——domesticmonetary
control, the safety and soundness of the banking system, prudential
management of pension and mutual funds, and desired competitive
conditionsin the financial services industry. The criticalpoint here
isthat the incidence of the policy—related barriers is not similar
across theworld'scapital markets, or even within a single capital
market. Consequently these barriers lead to segmentation effects both
between national capital market and within individual markets.
Other capital market barriers are more a function of the natural
economic environment or human behavioral patterns. Transaction costs
——ofbringing a new security to market, of discovering and verifying
information regarding an issuer, of enforcing contracts ——arean
obvious natural barrier to complete integration of international
capital markets. Perhaps as a result of different information sets,
33investors in different national markets may hold differentexpectations,
resulting in different assessments of securities prices. And investors
in different countries might have different age and incomeprofiles,
leading to different consumption/investment/risk preferences and,
therefore, to different prices of similar securities across countries.
All of these barriers, whether policy—related or natural,
encourage the segmentation of international capital markets and the
possibility that returns on similar securities (or portfolios of
securities) may not equalize across countries. As a result, profit
opportunities present themselves for borrowers and lenders who can
circumvent barriers at low cost.25 In addition, barriers also reduce
the number and variety of securities below the level observed in
perfect and complete markets. Profit opportunities also exist for
agents who can create new instruments at low cost for hedging
otherwise exposed risks.26
The above line of reasoning suggests that as long as investors are
risk—averse utility maximizers, they will continue to search out
arbitrage profit opportunities and to demand more complete financial
markets. Demand for financial vehicles is always present, but with the
existence of costly barriers, demand will be scaled by price and only
a subset of of financial vehicles will exist. What Ian Cooper (1986)
called the proximate causes of financial innovation (i.e. the search
for lower transaction costs, funding costs, new risk transferring
vehicles, and so forth) are always lurking. Why then has there been a
surge in financial innovation over the last several years?
The simple answer to this question is that a set of factors (what
Cooper labels as the ultimate causes of innovation) have led to a
34substantial outward shift in both the demand andsupply schedules for
new financial products and processes. On the demand side,rising
nominal and real funding costs in the late 197 Os andearly 198 Os
increased the willingness of borrowers to search out lowercost
funding. Volatility of asset prices, exchange rates and inflation
rates increased the price that investors and borrowers wouldpay for
protection against these risks. Changing world-wide wealth patterns
and the globalization of industrial markets increased the demandfor
global asset portfolios or funding strategies. Demand was also
probably heightened by user education and advances such as option
pricing models.
On the supply side, advances in telecommunications andcomputer
technology,increasing competition among financial intermediaries, and
regulatory changes all combinedto reduce the transaction costs of
creatingnew financial instruments and offering market—making
services. The impact of regulatory change cuts in twoways: permission
to begin trading in financial futures and options clearly helped these
instruments to develop, butpersistence of other regulatory barriers
mostlikely encouraged the search for close substitutes or parallel
markets in order to overcome these barriers. Regulatory encouragement
to increase the capital adequacy of banks and their return on assets
isalso credited as promoting the securitization of existing bank
assets and the shift into new financial products that lead to off—
balance sheet exposures.
Distinguishing between demand and supply factors may be somewhat
artificial because of the reciprocal nature of financial products ——
oneside of the transaction cannot proceed without the other. The
globalization of industrial activity suggests that it should be more
35common to find borrowers from around the world raising funds in
diverse markets, units of account and under diverse terms.The market
for financial intermediary services has been responsive tolink
together the demand and supply for particular products. As we noted
earlier, the supply of intermediary services itself has followedan
evolutionary process from specialty deals, to brokering, andfinally
market—making in standardized products. The financial services
industry appears particularly well-suited to overcome some of the
unique barriers (such as default risk, see footnote 25) thatare
present in international capital markets.
36V. Implications of Innovation on FinancialMarket Prices and Market Behavior
The process of financial market innovationthat we have been
describingleads directly to a number of imponanteconomic
consequences. In this section, we outline the major effectson
financial asset prices, internationalprice relationships andmarket
behaviorthat we would expect to observe asa result of the innovative
process.Then we review the empirical evidenceon internationalization
and integration of markets.
Given the steady financial innovationover the last two decades
and the substantial amount of activity in thesenew markets, we should
be able to observe and measure thefollowing major economic
differences:
1) Financial Market Behavior
a. lower transactions costs, greater liquidity,greater
substitutability between domestic financial products
b. wider array of financial products givingimproved
opportunities for transfer of risks and risk optimization
within investor portfolios
c. securitization of assets as investors valueliquidity, financial disintermediation
d. improved opportunities for funding riskier credits
e. greater competition for financial services business
2) International Financial Market Relationships
a. greater international capital mobility, existing barriers
removed or more easily circumvented
b. greater integration of international capitalmarkets, less
segmentation
c. greater similarity between cost of funds (currency and
risk adjusted) in alternative capital market locations
373) Macroeconomic Effects
a. fewer opportunities for pursuing national monetary and
policies using quantitative controls on credit
availability or interest rate levels
b. greater impact of monetary policy on exchange rates and
exchange rate variability
Central to the above hypotheses are the reduction in transaction costs
because of supply side factors (e.g. technological and regulatory
change) and demand factors (e.g. scale economies and the development
of secondary markets for new products). Arbitrage plays a key role in
the process. As both borrowers and lenders monitor the risk/return
properties of their portfolios in the face of a new menu of
securities, expected rates of return on securities (adjusted for
currency and risk factors) should be brought into closer conformity ——
i.e.market integration. Arbitrage, as well as the creation of new
synthetic securities, acts to reduce the burden of market
imperfections. The greater similarity of capital market products
across countries and their greater integration implies reduced scope
for pursuing monetary and credit policies based on quantitative
restrictions on credit or interest rate ceilings. It also suggests
that as monetary policies differ across countries, exchange rate
volatility will increase in response to capital mobility and portfolio
rebalancing by borrowers and investors.
As these financial market transactions are completely voluntary,
all those who directly participate should be better of f as a result.
These transactions enable borrowers and lenders to hold more desirable
portfolios, given that they face lower transaction costs and an
expanded opportunity set of financial instruments. For these players,
38capital allocations will be more in linewith economic risk/return
criteria. This should be a forcetending to increase economic
(allocational) efficiency, but other factors(discussed in the next
section) may act in the opposite direction.
In his analysis of recent innovation inJapanese financial
markets, Feldman (1986) suggests threeapproaches for measuring the
degree of internationalization of a financialmarket. The legal
approach focuses on the extent to which the lawprovides the right and
opportunity for cross-border capital flows. Thequantity approach
posits that a larger volume of cross—bordertransactions is associated
with greater internationalization. Theprice approach is the most
exacting. It posits that the internationalizationof a market is
complete when its prices are brought intoan international
equilibrium. Feldman takes the interest rateparity relationship as
his standard; when deviations fromcovered interest parity are small,
markets are assumed to be integrated underthe price approach.
What evidence is available to observewhether these financial
market and macroeconomic effects listed earlierare actually taking
place? The most obvious piece of evidencecomes from the scope of new
financial instruments and theirtrading activity outlined in Section
II. The legal framework has been built topermit trading in a wide
variety of financial futures and options contracts. Thelegal
framework for swap transactions is stilldeveloping, but substantial
progress has been made to standardize various provisions and wordings
ofswap arrangements.27 And manytransactions have moved offshore,
wherethe legal impediments to contract design and marketentry are
less severe. Using quantity as a criteria, it isclear that these new
securitiesplay an important role in investors' portfolios.
39On the international side, we also observe legal or institutional
agreements that promote international linkages. Some companies have
listed their securities on several exchanges around the worldfor
years. Recent evidence suggests that this practice may be especially
beneficial for firms from smaller countries who list their sharesin
the United States. Alexander and Eun (1985) conclude that theeffect
of dual—listing on share price is greater for firms from smaller
countries(e.g. Australia) which were more segmented from the U.S.
capital market. As these dual—listed firms experience a priceeffect,
arbitragepricing suggests that other non-dual—listed fins may show a
sympathetic price response, further integrating the international
markets.
A variation on this theme is the recent agreement linking the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and the Singapore International
Monetary Exchange (SIMEX). A futuresposition established on one
exchangemay be offset and closed with transactions on the other
exchange. This linkage expands the number of hours of trading per day
which can be useful when prices are extremely volatile.28
Two kinds of evidence concern the integration of prices in
international markets. The first addresses the "Lawof OnePrice" for
international securities. The dramatic growth of the Eurobond market
suggests that many companies (as Well as the United States Treasury)
are "arbitraging" the funding differences between the offshore and
onshore markets. The funding advantage of Eurobonds, which was
estimated by Kidwel]. (et. al.) to be in the 70-140 basis pointrange
in the 1977-81 period, declined to the 30-60 basis pointrange by
1983. A later study by Mahajan and Fraser (1986) examined 92 matched
40pairs of offerings in the Eurobond and U.S. bondmarkets between 1975
and 1983. Mahajan and Fraser concluded thatonce they had standardized
for issuer, maturity, rating andcoupon, they could not reject the
hypothesis that yield were similar in the two markets. Thissuggests
an integration and harmonization of terms between the two markets.29
The second source of evidence on the integrationof international
prices comes from tests of the interest rateparity condition and the
existence of covered interest arbitrage profits. Ithas long been
understood that covered interest arbitrage integratesthe short—term
Eurocurrency markets.3° But itisnow becoming more apparent that
longer—termEurocurrency markets, commercial paper markets (recall
Figure 4), and onshore short—term financial marketsare also being
integrated by actual or potential arbitrage.31 Feldman's(1986)
analysis of the Japanese market is a good example. Figure 5 showsthe
incentives for covered interest arbitrage betweenEurodollar and
Gensakis instruments over the 197 7-1984 period.32 Feldmanargues that
the deviation became insignificant in mid- tolate-198l, suggesting a
rise in internationalization. In addition, marketprofessionals
suggest that gains from interest rate and currencyswaps are now
relatively small, indicating that these markets provide for a high
degree of integration in international capital markets.33
Insert Figure 5 here
41VI. Policy Implications of Financial Market Innovation
The picture being painted soundsrosy, and this should not be very
surprising. If we begin with a market paradigm andopen up more
possibilities of choice and freedom fat borrowers andlenders, in a
potential sense, the world economy stands to be betteroff. Financial
innovations act to overcome many of the naturalbarriers that divide
and segment markets, and lead to allocationa]. inefficiencies.But
innovations also overcome many of the policy—relatedregulatory
barriers that were put in place as safeguardsor for particular policy
objectives.
Concern about the recent wave of financial innovationcenters
around two themes. First, that increased relianceon the market
mechanism ——andthe possibility of asset price overshooting,
excessive competition among financial players, increasedcredit
linkages between financial intermediaries andanonymous market
linkages between ultimate borrowers and lenders ——mayexpose the
financial system to additional risk in theaggregate. Second, that the
greater integration of international capital markets alters the
channels through which traditional policy tools work——reducingthe
effectiveness of quantitative controls on creditavailability and
interest rates and increasing the impact ofmonetary policy on the
external sector of the economy. At the theoreticalextreme, a small,
open economy subject to a high degree of capital mobility would find
it difficult to follow a monetary policy independentof those being
followed abroad. Innovation has made the financial marketsof all
countries more open and subject to greater capitalmobility.
The first policy theme centers on the relationship between
innovation and financial stability. Regulation of financialmarkets
42and institutions is intended to promote the safety and soundness of
this sector of the economy and thereby enhance the economy's overall
allocational efficiency. Existing regulations are designed to deal
with a variety of problems that may adversely effect economic
performance. The key objective is to protect the integrity of the
payments system, as this represents the life—blood of business
activity.
Financial institutions are known to be subject to agency problems,
as shareholders and depositors may find it difficult to monitor the
behaviorof bank managers. Consequently, regulations to constrain or
rule out certain kinds of activities may be warranted. Financial
institutions may also be subject to so—called insurance or moral
hazardproblems, whereby managers feel the incentive to take excessive
risks(given that the Federal government is insuring them) or add to
their off—balance sheet positions. Financial institutions might also
be subject to conflict of interest problems if they increased their
activities to include lending and underwriting for nonfinancial firms,
as well as brokerage sales and trust advisory services.
Financial innovation could clearly fuel additional fears over
these kinds of problems. Requiring financial institutions to disclose
their off—balance sheet positions would be an obvious first step.
Calculating insurance rates and capital adequacy requirements on the
basis of risk—adjusted measures also makes sense but might present
operational difficulties.
A related concern is whether financial innovation leads to an
increase in aggregate financial risk. A review of the risk attribute5
of the new financial instruments is presented in Table 13. These
43include market risk (the risk of moment—by—momentprice fluctuations),
credit risk (the risk of default by onecounterparty in a
transaction), settlement risk (the risk of default on the day of
contract delivery or settlement), and liquidity risk(the risk of not
being able to trade immediately). What is the overall impact ofthese
new instruments on risk?
Insert Table 13 here
Financial instruments which transfer price risk do notcreate
additional price risk. And to the extent that a more desirable
distribution of risk is achieved (from the standpointof each
individual),theeconomy may be better able to withstand certain
stressful periods. However, the transfer of riskthrough
intermediariescreates additional linkages in the financialsystem and
may raise its vulnerability to default, particularly in a period of
financial stress. In addition, as more playersare brought into the
system, to carry individualized risks associated with unbundled
securities, more players need to make credit and pricing assessments.
And, there is no established track record to guide the market for
making these assessments. Innovations may increase the availability of
debt financing in the economy, raising theaggregate debt level, and
making it more vulnerable to shocks.
Another line of argument concerns the behavior of financial
markets and unbridled competitive behavior. It is oftenargued that
assetprices move quickly and they may, in the short—run, overshoot
their long—run equilibrium value. If new financial instrumentsare
subject to this sort of price behavior, a considerable risk could be
added to the economy. Relatedto this concern is the possibility of
44excessive competition or excessive risk-taking within financial
institutions, perhaps related to the belief that behavior in these
institutions may be guided by perverse incentives (e.g. compensation
related to the volume of new business regardless of its risk). These
concerns are enhanced because many of the new financial instruments
lead to off—balance sheet exposures which may or may not be adequately
captured by existing accounting conventions and regulatory guidelines.
Dealing with the above concerns is possible, but obviously easier
said than done. The general point to be made is that a market system,
to the extent that information is made available, has many built—in
checks and balances that govern the behavior of market participants.
To work in a stable and orderly manner, market participants need to
make effective use of market information for decision making and
performance evaluation. "Narket information" implies accounting
systems based on a continuous revaluation or "marking—to—market" of
all financial positions (whether on the balance sheet or off) and
assessment of risks on a portfolio basis. It may be the case that
utilization of new financial instruments (interest rate swaps, for
example) have actually lowered the exposure of their portfolio
positions to interest rate risk, thereby reducing their capital needs.
Concern about mis—pricing of new financial instruments seems
exaggerated, since itcallsinto question the ability of banks to make
pricingand credit assessments of "traditional" instruments. The new
instruments require an assessment of liquidity risks, traditionally
represented by the bid/askspread, and default risks, which until
recentlywere the normal task of bank lending (credit) officers.
Excessivecompetition may be a concern associated with a new set
45of financial products, a scramble for an early dominant market
position,and the inevitable shake—out. However, some observers have
argued that regulatory groundrules (e.g. constant premium deposit
insurance and historical cost accounting systems) build in incentives
for managers to engage in excessive risk—taking. A market—based
regulatory system incorporating risk—adjusted insurance premia and
risk—adjusted capital adequacy requirements could put a natural brake
on excessive behavior.
Giventhe mobility of capital, any regulatory response to
financial innovation would need to be coordinated among national
regulatorybodies. Otherwise, the markets will continue to engage in a
kind of "regulatory arbitrage," seeking the lowest level of
constraintsin which to operate. National regulatory bodies may add to
this problem if they compete with each other in terms of regulatory
laxity in order to protect the market share of their domestic
financial institutions. The recent accord between U.S.andBritish
bank regulatory authorities announcing risk—based capital adequacy
standards within a highly similar set of rules is a welcome first step
toward international coordination.
The second, and final, policy theme concerns the impact of
financial innovation on domestic monetary policy. Financial innovation
has lowered transaction costs, increased the menu of available assets,
and increased the ease of substitution among assets. As a result, the
ability of authorities to measure and control the money supply has
been reduced. Individuals and firms also have increased their access
to variable rate financing and numerous risk hedging instruments. The
availability of variable rate financing may reduce the sting of
contractionary monetary policy as borrowers still have access to
46funds, for which they may be willingtemporarily to pay a higher rate.
Lenders receive higher interest incomeduring these periods which
tends to increase aggregate spending.
The greater concern is that because of theincreasing
international mobility of capital, the dominantchannel through which
monetary policy is now felt may be the exchange rate.If countries
are unable to coordinate their monetary policieseffectively, then
large exchange rate swings are more likely todevelop. Countries then
run the danger that protectionistpressures will mount, prducing a
contraction in international trade andreducing the gains from trade.
47VII. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has offered an overview of some of the financial market
innovations we have seen over the last few years, the causes of
innovation, and the implications of both in terms of economic effects
and policy responses. The incentives for financial innovationare
strong and at the foundation of a market system. Self—interest,
profit—maximization, risk optimization and technological change are
guiding the process. Benefits clearly accrue to those directly
involved in the innovating and trading process. Natural barriers that
segment world capital markets are under pressure resulting in a
tendency toward greater economic efficiency.
The transition from a segmented international capital market to
one that is more integrated will also impose some costs. There will be
greater demands for information and measures of the risk and return of
the new financial instruments. Policy—related barriers (taxes,
regulations, and so forth) will also lose some of their force, and to
the extent that these were used for prudential control, other policies
will have to take their place. The need to coordinate regulatory
policies will increase. Monetary policy is more likely to effect the
external sector of the economy via exchange rates, potentially raising
the demand for trade protection. This prospect heightens the need for
macroeconomic policy coordination.
In a potential sense, the world economy stands to benefit from the
financial innovative process. But the process is not without its
risks and not without increasing demands for policy coordination.
48FOOTNOTES
1. Assessments of the recent experience havebeen prepared by the
Bank of England (1983), the OECD (1984) andGermany and Morton
(1985). By far the most comprehensive reportdescribing recent
innovations and their possible welfare andpolicy implications is
that of the Study Group of the Group of Ten Countries(referred to
in this paper as the G-lO report) publishedby the Bank for
International Settlements in April 1986.
2.Art interesting and potentially highly importantarea of financial
innovation is that dealing with the EuropeanCurrency Unit (ECU).
Since the introduction of the EuropeanMonetary System in March
1979, the the ECU has been propelled to greater importanceas a
legal parallel currency for transactions throughout most of
Europe.Anarray of innovative ECU products (e.g. ECU—denominated
deposits,loans, swaps, bonds, futures, options and numerous
variations on these themes), applications (e.g. ECUinvoicing) and
institutions (e.g. the Mutual ECU Settlement Association for
clearing transactions) have quickly developed. It is beyond the
scopeof this paper to discuss these developments in detail. The
reader is referred to Levich (1987a, l987b), Levich and Sominariva
(1987) and the references cited therein for further discussion.
3.Informal estimates of the volume of foreign exchange trading in
various centers are reported in Group of Thirty (1985, p.11).
4. The bank, Banque Commerciale pour l'Europe dii Nord, carried the
cable address EUROBANK, which latter became synonymous with the
general activity of accepting deposits offshore. See Kvasnicka
(1969).
5. See Dam (1982, pp. 322—6).
496. For a further description of International Banking Facilities, see
Chrystal (1984).
7. Salomon Brothers (1986, p. 24).
8. When asked whether the impact of Chicago's futures markets on the
underlying asset markets wasn't an example of "the tail wagging
the dog," Richard Sandor replied that the questioner was mistaken
——"thedog had moved to Chicago." Proceedings of the Conference
on Hedging with Financial Futures for Institutional Investors,
Salomon Brothers Center, New York University.
9. Miller (1986, p.15).
10. More complex strategies are possible. For example, a corporation
seeking 5—year funds might borrow for 10-years, and sell the final
years proceeds forward.
11. Gaz de France represents an interesting case study. Between 1983
and 1985 the company entered into 102 swap transactions totalling
$7.4 billion to completely transform the currency profile of their
financing away from U.S. dollars and toward European currencies
including the ECU. See Reboul (1987) for details.
12. See Miller (1977) for a discussion of the use of securities
markets for tax shifting.
13. A thorough discussion of foreign exchange option pricing and
market characteristics is presented in Grabbe (1986, Chapter 6).
14. For example, a forward contract might be split into the
combinationof a put and call option. A U.S. Treasury security
might be split into its principal and interest components.
5015. Figlewski (1986) presents a thorough analysis of theuse of
financial futures for hedging portfolios ofmoney market
instruments.
16. For further details, see First Boston (1986,pp. 218—22).
17. See Giddy and Hekman (1984) for a formal demonstration.
18. For further details, see Bock(1983).
19. The cost is approximate because we ignore (i) interest
compounding,(ii)U.S.commercialpaper is sold for same day
deliverywhile foreign exchange quotations are for twoday
delivery, and (iii) transactions costs in the commercialpaper
program and forward contracts. See Kreiner (1986) for a thorough
analysisof these costs.
20. Alternative approaches for computing the cost of a long—term
forwardcontract are reviewed in Antl (1983).
21. A good example are the so—called "bull and bear" bonds, whichare
Eurobonds with payoffs index-linked to the performance of the West
German or Japanese stock markets. These instruments are a close
substitute for actual stock index options on these markets that
are currently outlawed. National regulators could attempt to
imposesanctions on buyers or sellers of these offshore
securities, but this form of control is untested.
22. Futures contracts were traded on over 128 products during the last
century. Recently, only 45 commodities were actively traded on
futures markets, including just 8 of the 23 commodities traded in
1929. See, Deborah Black (1986) for a model of success and failure
of futures contracts based on commodity and contract
characteristics.
5123. Classic definitions of perfect capital markets (forexample,
Fan and Miller [1972, pp. 20-22]) often begin with thecase of
certainty. In the certainty case, all individuals necessarily
share thesameinformation and expectations. Individuals still
require financial markets under certainty to smooth their lifetime
consumption to its desired path.
24. For a formal proof, see Cox and Rubinstein (1985, Chapter8)
and the references cited therein.
25. A barrier that applies more in the case of internationalcapital
markets is the absence of a clear mechanism for enforcinglegal
contracts across borders. The possibility of debt repudiationmay
be a significant factor leading to reduced internationalcapital
flows and the existence of apparent arbitrage profits. Dumas
(1986) argues that financial service firms may be in a position to
bridge this gap. Unlike the occasional borrower, the penalty for
repudiation would be high; a major financial firm cannot afford to
lose its reputation and so the chance of repudiation on their part
is slim. In this way, financial services firm substitute for the
non—existence of a contract enforcement mechanism.
26. Black's (1986) model incorporates this result, predicting that
futures contract are more likely to be successful in the
marketplace if they increase the ability of people to hedge their
risks (i.e. if the increase the hedging effectiveness offered in
the market). The presence of transaction costs might increase the
number of useful hedging vehicles. For example, even if options
contracts were traded on all 500 securities of the Standard and
Poor's 500 index, an S & P 500 index option would still be a
cheaper way to take a position on all securities simultaneously.
5227. The International Swap Dealers Association(1986) has promulgated
a Code intended to standardize and simplifyswap documentation.
Parties to a swap agreement may adopt the Code in itsentirety or
selectively. Express provisions in a swap contract always override
anythingto tht contrary in the Code.
28. Other formal linkages exist between the New YorkCommodities
Exchange (CONEX) and the Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE), the
Chicago Board of Trade (CBT) and the London International
Financial Futures Exchange(LIFFE), and the SFE and LIFFE. The
NationalAssociation of Security Dealers and the London Stock
Exchangeare conducting a pilot project for the exchange of stock
price quotations, also aimed at expanding internationaltrading
opportunities.
29. Somewhat contrary evidence comes from the United StateTreasury
issues targeted to the Eurobond market. These datasuggest that
targetted Euro—U.S. Treasuries yield about 30 basis points less
than comparable Treasury issues in the United States.By
implication, the Treasury could increase the supply of offerings
inthe Eurobond market before interest rates would equalize with
onshore Treasury issues.
30.See, for example, Aliber (1973) and Frenkel and Levich (1975).
31. See Dooley and Isard (1980) and Frenkel and Levich (1981).
32. Feldman's analysis on this point leaves some ambiguity. Re
discusses the interest rate parity relationship as the criteria
for market integration, but then uses the expected rate of
exchange rate change rather than the forward premium in his
formulation.
33. See Morgan Guaranty Trust (1986, p. 3)
5334. See Nash, "Similar Standards for Banks are Set by U.S. and
Britain," New York Times, January 9, 1987, Section A, page 1.
54ThBIE 1.
Average Eily Threign Extharqe Pradixg Volume
by Iccatia ant Qirrency
Iakjal New York New York(1977)
iily Volune, Mart 1986 $48 $90 $50 $5
(Billicns of US $)
PercentageShare
Sterling 30 19 17
28 34 27
Yen 82 14 23 5 Swiss franc 9 10 14 flitthfrarc 4 4 6 Italian lire 2 1
Canadian dollar 2 6 19
Cross—an-rercy aid FflJ 4 —
DtdiGuilder 1 6 Other 18 7 3 5
'Ibtal 100 100 100 100
San'ces: Press releases of the Bank of Thkyo, Bank of England,
aid the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
55Thble 2.
Disersicr of the Da-ocurrency Deposit Market
(Billin of U.S. Ibliars)
flirodollars U.S. Money Year Gross SizeNet Size as % of Gross Stock (M2)
1973 315 160 74% 861
1974 395 220 76 908
1975 485 255 78 1023
1976 595 320 80 1164
1977 740 390 76 1287
1978 950 495 74 1389
1979 1235 590 72 1498
1980 1525 730 75 1631
1981 1954 1018 79 1794
1982 2168 1152 80 1955
1983 2278 1237 81 2189
1984 2386 1277 82 2372
1985 2846 1480 75 2564
1986 (Jwe) 3059 1584 72 N.A.
Qznird Growth19.9% 20.1% 9.5%
Scnross: Morgan Qaranty Trust Cb., World Financial Markets,
varicas issues.
Econanic Iort of the President, 1986, Table B—64.
56TABLE 3.
Dinensicrsofthe flirthax Market
(Bihin of U.S. Ibilars)
___ForeignIbtal Internatiaal US Cbrporate
Year Tbtal $-denatdnated Bads Bad Issues Bad Issues
1970 3.0 — 1.6 4.6 29.0
1971 3.6 — 2.6 6.3 30.1
1972 6.3 3.9 3.4 9.7 25.6
1973 4.2 2.4 3.6 7.8 20.7
1974 2.1 1.0 4.7 6.9 31.5
1975 8.6 3.7 11.3 19.9 42.8
1976 14.3 9.1 18.2 32.5 42.2
1977 17.7 11.6 14.5 32.2 42.3
1978 14.1 7.3 20.2 34.3 20.5
1979 18.7 12.6 22.3 41.0 26.5
1980 24.0 16.4 17.9 41.9 44.6
1981 31.6 26.8 21.4 53.0 38.2
1982 51.6 44.0 26.4 78.0 45.4
1983 48.5 38.4 27.8 76.3 50.2
1984 79.5 63.6 28.0 107.4 59.6
1985 136.7 97.8 31.0 167.8
1986(Oct)b163.4 102.7 30.7 194.1 N.A.
OrpouM 29.0% 28.1% 21.9% 27.1%
gratif
a -firstthree quarters at annual rate
b-thrwgherri of Octcber, itt anruialized
c —througheM of 1985
Sances: )brgan Guaranty Trust, World Finarcial Markets, varictis issues.
Eaanttic ort of t1 President, 1986, Table B—90.
57TABlE 4.




________Year—md___________ Rate% ofTotalRatio to
1975 1980 1985 1986! 1975—85 19751985 1985 GDP
U.S.Ibilar $786 $1,473 $3,119 $3,66014.8% 48.1%50.4%79%
JapaneseYen 130 5771,0811,53023.6 7.9 17.5 68
Daztsdienark 212 505 639 84911.6 13.0 10.3 86
ItalianLira 106 166 275 38210.0 6.5 4.4 76
Frendi Pratt 51 110 173 24513.0 3.1 2.8 28
U.K. Sterlin 85 212 211 232 9.5 5.2 3.4 42
Datthaiilder 41 86 123 16111.6 2.5 2.0 83
Belgianflair 46 105 111 1509.2 2.8 1.8117
cnadian DDllar 57 91 131 146 8.6 3.5 2.1 39
tanithxraie 32 71 102 13512.2 2.0 1.6151
Swedish cma 38 77 101 12610.3 2.3 1.6 89
Swiss flair 25 54 77 10612.0 1.5 1.2 70
Australian DDllar 27 41 50 55 6.6 1.6 0.8 33
Total $1,636 $3,566 $6,192 $7,77614.2% 71%
Sc*xr:Salaniri Brothers, lit. (1986)
Notes: a —Estünateas ofSeptember30, 1986
58ThBT.E 5.
Net Borrowirq by U.S. Naifinarcial Ct)rponti(xls
(Bihiais of U.S. Ebilars)
1981198219831984 1985 1986
S.iritiz Financjn 45.037.727.278.4 90.5 98.6 rporate s 28.144.224.6 55.3 77.0 90.5 Cpen Market Papár 16.9-6.52.6 23.1 13.5 8.1
nk loans 43539.718.077.0 35.5 27.1
Ratio of Seairitiz
Finarcirg to Bank Loans 1.030.951.511.02 2.55 3.64
Sair: Salcaini Brothers, lit. (1986, p.55)
59TABlE 6.
StockMarket Value ofLctarqe-Listed DzrEstjcOzipanies (Bilhia,s ofU.S.I11ars)
At
Grafth
___________Year—Enl__________Rate% of Tbtal Ratio to
1975 1980 1985 1986 1975—8519751985 1985 GDP
U.S.Dallar $704$1,237$2,014$2,20211.1% 61.2% 49.5% 51%
JapaneseYen 142 380 948 1,78320.9 12.323.3 60
U.K. Sterlirq 86 205 354 38415.2 7.5 8.7 70
Dwtsthenark 51 72 178 21713.2 4.5 4.4 24
canadian Dallar 5]. 117 157 16312.0 4.4 3.9 47
FreixtiFranc 35 55 79 1288.4 3.1 1.9 13
ItalianLira 11 25 58 11218.3 0.9 1.4 15
Swisspraxc 17 43 84 9717.7 1.4 2.1 77
Ditch Guilder 18 29 59 7712.5 1.6 1.5 40
Australian Dallar 20 60 60 69 U.6 1.7 1.5 39
Swedishxrcria 2 13 37 5732.7 0.2 0.9 33
BelgianFranc 9 10 21 32 8.8 0.8 0.5 22
tanishxrone 4 6 15 1513.9 0.4 0.4 22
Ittal $1,150$2,251$4,065$5,33513.5%100.0 100.0 46%
Saute: Sa]atapBrothers,Inc. (1986)





Residential)brtgage 22.0 55.066.7114.0253.3217.0 iitnrcia1)brtgage — — 1.3 6.0 5.6 7.0
Autatile Iivab1es —— — — 10.0 15.0
tritrd Reivab1es .05 1.0
TOtal 22.0 55.0 67.0120.0269.0 240.0
Notes:a -Estimate
I,-Forecast
Sante:Salcnon Brothers, Inc. (1986)
61TABLE 8.
Aqgreatecen Interest
inMajorWorldFinancialflithres ard Ctions ntncts
(Bihinof U.S. Ibllars)
19751980 1984 1985 1986:3
FUtures 0.2 81.0 190.7 253.7439.9
IntentRate Q,ntracts 0.078.8 182.1 236.0412.4 Bas 0.035.9 25.0 49.5104.3
)bney Market 0.042.9157.1 186.5308.1
StatkIrder contracts 0.0 0.0 4.6 9.718.1 Qirrercies 0.22.2 4.0 8.09.4
cptia,s 0.00.0 40.3138.2239.6
InterestRate contracts 0.00.0 21.5 88.8161.9
Bords 0.00.0 21.5 41.445.8
Market 0.0 0.0 0.0 47.4116.1
StodcIniex contracts 0.0 0.0 14.7 37.138.9
currercjes 0.0 0.0 4.1 12.338.8
/iggre3atecpen Interesta 0.2 81.0 231.0 391.9679.5
Notes: a -Measurel) dollar par or iixlex value of cutstardin positions
on the last thyof the penaL
Scxiroe:Salarn Brothers, Inc. (1986,p. 23)
62TA&E 9.
ggreate tily PralizgVolume inMajor WorldFinarxia1 Futhres azt Cptiais Cbntracts (Bihin of U.S. llars)
19751980 1984 1985 1986:3
Ptzthres 0.0 25.3 55.1 86.0 134.6
Interest Rate itracts 0.0 24.2 46.7 73.4 115.9
Bcnis 0.0 6.0 11.9 25.7 57.9
)tneyMarkst 0.0 18.2 34.8 47.7 58.0
Stack Irriex tracts 0.0 0.0 5.5 8.9 14.4
Qirrerties 0.0 1.1 2.9 3.7 4.3
cptiais 0.0 0.0 8.2 24.5 34.4
Interest Rate tncts 0.0 0.0 1.9 11.5 16.3 Bas 0.0 0.0 1.9 6.5 6.7
l'tneyMartet 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 9.6 StockIrriex Itncts 0.0 0.0 6.0 12.3 15.6
Qirrercies 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.7 2.5
Aqreate Tradirq Voltmea0.0 25.4 63.2 110.5 169.0
Notes: a -tuilyaverageof the dollar par or inlex value oftransactions
Sante: Sa1cca Brothers, Dc. (1986, p. 23)
63Th&E 10.
Interest te aid Oarrercy Swap Activity
0-











1986:4 aoo.cP 38.0 3&.76c
Notes:a -totalannzt c*itstarxlin at erd of period in bihiais of U.S.
dollars. b -Nuiterof critracts ccwluial durirq period
C -Fstinted
Sair: ?trgan Guaranty Trust O., World Financial Markets, Decerter 1986.
Salcaini Brothers, lit. (1986, p. 23)
64Table 11.
A Classification of Innovations











Source: Bank for International
International Banking,























































Evolution ofthe Qirrercy aid Interest Rate Swap Market
rate Thase Tndin Arrargenent Volume
1970's Arbitrage of Parallel loans Small
regulation
1980—81 Arbitrage of market Inten&iated agreements Small
ananalies (1)
1982—83 Arbitrage of market Inteunediatal with bank$20 Billion
anomalies (2) inventories
1984 StM)JBnjIZ&1 traded Market makinj an stardard $100 Billion
swaps contracts
1985— rivative agreementsMar]cet-'makirg on stardard $2 00—300
on swats (forward itracts Billion
swaps, swap tin)
Sairce: Adapted fran Ian Qier (1986).
66Table 13.
Comparative Risks of New Financial Market Instruments
Credit risk
Writerforprei.tuntil paid,buyer for cost of r.place.nt
until exercised.
Settienc risk
Praniun sent on pay—
sent date, principal atuotforbocb parties
if exercised. (&se party






tat if cash settled.)
Market liquidity riak
cbange and GTC options
new, liquidity of arkats
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asrket spreads if market
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untested.
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sunc of market risk.
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deposit.
Limited to ssount of
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See as above. See as above.
Fills
Securitised credits
See as bond.FIGURE 1
InternationalBorrowing Through Syndicated Bank Loans Versus
Tradeable Bonds and Notes
Uha
2337
— Syndicated bank loin,
of which:Olliciellysponsored loans
International bonds and notes
—
of which; FIoalin9 rite notes
Note issuanco fecilitios
0
1902' 1983 1304 1385
Source: Bank for International Settlements, Annual Report, 1986.
68FIGURE 2
Average Daily Trading Volume in Treasury Bond Futures
and Underlying Cash Bonds
(Billions of U.S. Dollars)
Source: First Boston Corporation, Handbook of Securities of the United
States Government and Federal Agencies, 1986, p. 225.
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Construction of Synthetic Securities:















Euro—DM Rate minus Constructed DM Commercial Paper Rate


















Source:Irene Ereiner, "Short—Term Multicurrency Funding Via the U.S.
Commercial Paper Market," 1986.
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Deviationsfrom Covered Interest Parity:
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